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DEVELOPMENT FOR WHAT? - FALSE GODS AND HOLY WRIT
Antony A1lott
Years ago (1964 to be exact) I contributed to a symposium published
in the United States and entitled "Development - for What?". I always
felt that the best feature of this symposium was its title, and the
challenge it posed. The fact that my own contribution to it concerned
"The African conception of the Rule of Law" shows how widely development
was apparently conceived. And yet the presuppositions, not just of the
contributors to this symposium but of most subseouent writers and doers
in the field, have been that development is basically about economic
development. Even such sceptics as Peter Bauer apoear to take it for
granted that development is about economic development:
I use interchangeably the terms material
advance, material progress and economic
development. The former expressions are more
appropriate than economic development, as they do
not suggest that material prooress depends on
factors which economists are especially qualified
or even uniquely qualified, to analyse or
promote.1
Fortunately, Bauer recognises that economic development does not occur in
isolation, because he goes immediately afterwards to redeem his position
somewhat:
Moreover, the reference to meterial advance and
material progress may help to indicate that
economic development is but one aspect of the
total historical evolution of societies and one
which, for many purposes of analysis and oolicy,
is inseparable from other elements of social
life.2
But he does not go far enough, as far as this present paper advocates, to
ask what development is for.
"By their deeds ye shall know them". It is not by the declarations
of development experts and development planners, but by what they do,
that we may judge what they think their task to be. If you scrutinize
the pages of practical development journals, you will find that most
projects described relate in some form, directly or otherwise, to the
material betterment of the life of the people in the ."underdeveloped", or
"less developed" countries. Even education and family planning
programmes, to mention two popular examoles of apparently non-economic
actiob areas, are seen as pre-conditiors to economic development, rither
than the other way round. Achievement of rapid economic growth is one of
the main aims of "development", to which must hp sacrificed the
intangibies which go to make up life in society. It is, then, a "false
god", in so far as it seduces its worshippers from contemplation of the
true and more distant goal.. Similarly, there is largely a consensus
among development experts, codified in UN documents and in the
literature, about the classification of the world's peoples with respect
to development. This body of doctrine constitutes a sort of "Holy Writ",
dissent from which attracts the full attention of the scholarly Holy
Inquisition.
We are now being asked to consider the relationship of law and
development and the right to development in the national and
International contexts. Is this "right to development" a new god whose
image has recently been erected, or is it merely a re-affirmation of what
has,. since the Second World War, been a fundamental axiom of
international relations? Or, more suggestively and in my view more
acceptably, is it a fundamental axiom of human life in society viewed,
not from the collectivist but from the individualist standpoint? We
cannot hope to achieve a practical realisation of our development aims,
whatever they may be, through the instrument of law and in the language
of rights, unless we have a clear notion of what we intend by
"development" in the first place. So much is obvious,
The meenina of "development".
Too often and unthinkingly, development is defined as "econcmic
development", ie. an expansion or growth in resources. We can agree
that there is a distinction, not always easy to draw, between economic
growth and economic development. indeed, one of the more successful
critical books about the Liberian economy was entitled "Growth without
development". What appears to be intended by the distinction is tnat a
mere increase in the indices of production, of consumption, of energy
use, of whatever factor we choose, does not necessarily mean a permanent
lifting up of the curve on the graph, where the curve represents pecp.e's
experiences of economic benefit rather than the planner's figures of
production. Nor does expansion of these factors by itself guarantee a
qualitative change at the structural level in those aspects of the
aconomic system which help to determine whether the economy is soundly
based and whether it has further possibilities of development: "more does
not necessarily mean better",
It is a pity that so many developmental thinkers tend to have an
economic background and thus to wear the blinkers of their
professionalism. While it is true that many items in the programme of
changing life for the better require resources, ,and often additiona:
resources, such resources are mere means to defined gnais or ends, and
not ends in tnemselves. Building a tne.tre is not development;
development means expanding one' s horizons by using, that theatre for
entertainment and expression of one's ta,.ents. lhis simple exarple
brings out another point, that there is often an obsession with
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structures rather than with the individual for whom the structures exist
and who alone can give such structures meaning. Confusion of means and
ends; structural change rather than individual development; a purely
economic view of life: these are some of the common weaknesses of the
development professionals.
By way of contrast,. I see development as the enhancement of life and
of life possibilities for the ordinary individual, not merely his
betterment in a strictly economic, still less a purely statistical
sense. The long-term aim is not merely to conserve, but to improve, the
lot of the individual in society. Put like that, there would seem to be
no upward limit to developmental ambitions. But reality imposes a whole
series of strictly limited targets. If King Henry IV of France could in
the 16th century have as his developmental ambition that
"I want there to be no peasant in my kingdom so
poor that he cannot have a chicken in his pot
every Sunday,"
we can accept that this ambition has been fully recognized by the 20th
century for his and other European countries; but the taking in of
sufficient protein for healthy life is still an unrealisable ambition in
many African countries. Economic goods are mere instruments to a better
life, but by themselves neither sufficient nor necessary for a happy
life. The goal for the individual is thus as much social and
psychological as it is economic. Education, to take one typical and
avidly sought-after good, needs resources for its expansion, but by
itself does not necessarily yield life-enhancement or personal
satisfaction. It all depends on the kind of education, and the purposes
to which it can be put.
On this view of what is meant by development, one immediate and
startling conclusion emerges. There is no country in the world whose
inhabitants can confidently say, "we have no further need for
development", meaning: "there is nothing further that can be done to
enhance the life of individual citizens in our state". The mere
assertion is grotesque. In my own country, Britain, despite its vast
increases in social welfare in the last century, the existence of
universal education, the fact that no one need now starve or go without a
home, and so on, every individua1 could rightly claim that he or she had
a personal agenda of life-enhancement which could be implemented if given
the necessary equipment, opportunities and assistance.
This is not at ail the same as to say that econcmic growth is still
desirable and possible in the "developed" industrialissd countries.
Finite resources impose strict ceilings on the upward expansion of
econoaic activity. There will come a time, maybe soon, when the built-in
assumptions about growth cease to have validity. But life-enh3ncement
can still go on.
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In the result, all countries are "developing", except that this
suggests an ineluctable process of nature rather than a consciously
intended programme; all countries are developable, in other words.
"Undeveloped" will not do, then; nor will "underdeveloped", because it
suggests a norm or standard which cannot be defined, and which no one has
authority to define. "Less developed" seems less objectionable; but, and
it is a most important but, it incorporates the worship of the false
economic god by implication. What a "less developed country" has less of
is not things like opera houses, or opportunities for individuals to
enjoy themselves or develop their talents; the measure is that it has a
smaller GNP her head, or fewer roads. It is true that the statisticians
cannot find quantitative measures to gauge the degree of development in
this less definable sense, so they restrict themselves to economic
measures. But by doing so they subscribe to the great seif-deception
that what cannot be quantified has no value. "What cannot be counted
does not count."
Thepurpose of development.
To ask, "for what is development?", is not enough: the question
really includes the subsidiary question, "for whom is development?". We
can distinguish between immediate and ultimate goals. Immediate goals
include the provision of infra-structures, the expansion of monetary
resources, the exploitation of assets. Ultimate goals are for the
enhancement of life and iife possibilities for the individual in
society. Governments do not often see the task like this. Their
approach is conditioned by their underlying political and social
philosophy but there is a surprising convergence between governments of
different political tendencies. The command, socialist, dirigiste type
of state finds that development philosophies are congenial to it, if and
in so far as development is seen as something imposed in the interests of
the collectivity from above and on its subjects. The goal in such a
government's eyes is the maximisation of various factors, outputs or
structural provisions, be these agricultural production, factory output
or kilometres of roads built. So far from the idea that development
ought to contribute to the betterment of life for the individuals
currently living in that society, some governments adopt the philosophy
that development may mean a forced worsening of life in the present in
the interests of a hypothetical improvement of life in some future
century. The question, "Development - for what?", is thus answered by
them as: "for future generations, but not for now". The result of such
philosophies is a distancing of governmental development policy from the
people it should otherwise be serving.
In theory the situation should be greatly different in the more
iiberai free-market societies; but a similar manipulation of people in
the interest of some larger macro-economic goal can be obvserved in such
societies too. There is a strong element of dirigisme even in so-called
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free enterprise or capitalist societies. Thus a very strong element of
economic engineering dominated the thinking of the East Africa Royal
Commission,.and later influenced the land consolidation programme in
*Kenya. By opting for an individualist solution to development needs, the
aim of the planners was not merely to foster growth, but to foster demand
as the lead factor in the stimulation of economic activity. Needs had to
be created where they did not exist before; in other words,
dissatisfaction was seen as-an important mechanism in the encouragement
of the individual towards a more productive (in western terms) future.
Whether the stimulation of demands and the creation of needs necessarily
increase individual happiness is a question worth debating; but few
economists discuss development in terms of happiness. The "Quality of
Life Index", now favoured by some as a measure of development, takes
three significant parameters (significant only because quantifiable) as
indicative of the quality of life in a given society, But this does not
in fact measure the quality of life, merely the quaniy of certain
measures. We should abandon the QLI in favour of a GF, .or "General
Felicity Index", which, despite its echoes of Benthamite utilitarianism,
surely expresses what governments should be seeking to achieve, viz. the
maximising, taken over the whole society, of individual felicity. Such a
measure can be seen as the obverse, the flip side, of the social justice
coin.
Of course, if you don't accept that the aim, not just of development
planning but of government in general, is the maximising of individual
felicity, and adopt instead some variant of the centralist and
collectivist thesis, then the preceding paragraph will have little
appeal. But, in the latter alternative, one may legitimately ask, what
is government for? There is no doubt what governments, of whatever
persuasion, say they are for: all agree in saying that they exist for the
benefit of those they ruie. Unfortunately, however, discussion of
government, and of development too, often has a high hypocrisy quotient,
where governments, and individual commentators, often say one thing and
do another. They say that development is to make the lot of the people
better; but the declarations of governments which say this and improve
the lot of their peasants by, say, grindirg them down with taxes or even
shooting them, attract little credence. If development is seen, not as a
continuing process and one where the aim is to improve the lot of the
individual, but as something commanded and imposed from above, then it
will engage the suPport of those who wield the levers of power centrally,
and they wiil wield these levers with scant regard to the declared aims
which they purport to espouse.
In asking what development is for, what its purpose is, we are being
required-in effect to strike a series of balances, with items in the
debit as well as the credit side of the ledger. Development, in the
sense of planned development, is likely to encounter the network of
social forces represenred by culture, religion, worid-view, normative
systems, and family structures (the list is not exhaustive), How far do
governments and those who professionally advise them take into account
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the impact of their proposals and projects on these intangibles? They
may be seen as obstacles to development, and often are: "if only the
people weren't so backward, with their adherence to out-of-date social
systems, land tenure, religious beliefs and so on, then we would have no
difficulty in implementing our proposals for social or economic
development, be they the modernisation of agriculture, the emancipation
of women, or whatever." A cri de coeur. How often, though, do
governments and those who p rofessionaiiy advise them draw up a
balance-sheet and say: "If we implement this or this proposal, then the
people affected stand to lose this or this feature to which they are
attached, and to which they attribute value."?
The right to development.
Who, first, is the right-holder? If, following the assumptions of
the development professionals, and of governments, one takes the units of
discourse to be states or peoples, viewed as a collectivity, then we are
asking whether countries have a right to development, what the content of
that right is, and against whom it is held. If one takes the unit of
discourse as the individual human being living in society, that he is the
primary beneficiary of development, and that development projects, even
when they purport to benefit the community, are taken to do so because at
the end of the day it is the individual members of that community who are
to benefit, then our discussion of the "right to development", of its
content and against whom it is held, will come out very differently.
This is the aspect which I shall briefly discuss here.
I have explained what I understand by "development". It goes far
beyond economics or resources; it extends to the maximisatlon of
happiness via the enhancement of life and life possibilities for the
individua±, whatever his or her status or position in life. Every human
has this right by virtue of being human. A right represents a claim, or
in this case a set of claims, against identifiable individuals. It can
either be negative or positive. In the narrow sense, a right is
attributed by and in a legal system. Clearly here we are not talking
about rights in a legal system. We are talking about claims which
everyone ought to be able to put forward by virtue of his or her
membership of humanity and of a given society, in other words, about
"rights" in the natural order, which flow from man's being a social
animal. Such "rights" provide a goal and a critique. A goal, in that
morally speaking all human systems of law and government should
incorporate them as far as possible. A critique, in that their statement
allows us to criticise existing systems of law and government to see how-
far they correspond with these objectives.
My own view of law, and indeed of government, is that it should be
"peopie-centred". Government, in the time-honoured words, should
approximate the aim of being by the people, of the peopie, for the
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people. Development similarly. Development, in other words, is for
people and not for elite groups. A people-centred view of development
means much more than that development should serve the individual's
needs. Too often development, and government, are by proxy: those who do
it, who engineer it, purport to do so in the best interests of the
people, purport to represent the people or to speak for them. Such
representativeness is sufficiently dubious in an elective democracy,
where the people appear to have chosen their representative; it is
dubious unless there is a co6tinuous and real dialogue between rulers and
ruled, and the views and wishes (not just.their assumed needs) of the
people, taken singly as well as collectively, determine the policies
followed. The claim to be representative, to speak for the people, has
even less credibility where there is an unelected or dictatorial
government: it is not God, or history, or political ideology which gives
a mandate to one group of persons to rule over another, but the voluntary
and continuing assent of those who are ruled.
So the right to development is the individual citizen's right; and
government, and the procedures for the formulation of development
policies and plans, must take account of this fact.
A right is a claim against someone: against whom does the "right to
development" in this sense operate? It operates, first against
governments. Governments have the duty to maximise the felicity and
well-being of those they rule. It operates secondlv against fellow
members of the society. 7he right to enhancement of life and Life
possibilities does not, however, authorise a Robin Hood philosophy, still
less a general demand for ce-distribution of misery. Negatively, it
implies that no one else should wittingly and unjustifiably impede each
Individual's search for life-enhancement. Positively, it implies some
variant of social justice policy, the content of which cannot be spelt
out here, but which will vary according to one's appreciation of how far
the good society should go in the obtaining of social justice.
Do less advantaged individuals in a less advantaged country of, say,
the so-called Third World have a claim against more advantaged
individuals or more advantaged countries? This brings-us into the
international dimension of the discussion, which we shall be looking at
later. It is just worth remioding ourselves that the dictum, "the poor
we have always with us", is true to the extent that the definition of
poverty remains relative. Some are aiways going to be better off than
others. By a definition, then, we can make people "poor" Similariy, by
a definition we car. always retain a pool of less developed or
insufficiently advantaged countries or persons.
Conclusion
I have said nothing about the false gods which the apostles of
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development, whether they come from East or West, have tended to worship
in their pursuit of the goal of development. Forced industrialisation,
whether on the western capitalist plan or the socialist Stalinist model,
has proved a major destructive force, as much as the engine of
development, in too many countries. The neglect of agriculture and rural
development has been shameful. Conspiracy theories, one-cause answers,
cannot excuse these failures. But few looking at African economies today
(I say nothing of other parts of the world) could deny that many of them
are now broken-backed. What development potential they had is
exhausted. There has been a steady decline, not a steady improvement, in
standards of life and the quality of life. The concept of development
almost becomes a mockery in such circumstances. It is no longer a
question of enhancing life, but of preventing it from deteriorating still
further.
Should one conclude that it has been a hopeless enterprise, sparked
by illusion out of the desperate desire to catch up? Is it too much to
expect countries to leap centuries in their economic development? There
is cause neither for boundless pessimism nor for unrestricted optimism.
There have been distinct gains. Thus the delivery of medical secvices
and the availability of education, as well as the avoidance of
enslavement and of intertribal warfare, mark out this era from the way
things were before the encounter with the West really began. But the
picture is not one of gains only: one could argue that the minimum which
any competent society should provide for its citizens is that they should
have enough to eat and somewhere to live. Traditional societies in
Africa, with their principle of community-based access to land and the
simplicity of housing built on traditional lines, at least purported to
offer these two guarantees. Now more and more African countries announce
themselves as incapable of growing enough food to feed their millions,
and for too many the quest for a home means a desperate struggle to find
a toehold in some urban slum.
The limits of planning; the failures of centrally directed, rather
than people-centred, development; the emphasis on industrialisation; the
neglect of the rurai peasantry; undue reliance on "experts" - all these
are topics which arise for discussion when one contemplates the
development scene. The construction of appropriate development
strategies in implementation of the "right to development" is a worthy
and challenging task for the remainder of this century.
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